

Introduction: Overview of the 1996-97 Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) and the Treaty of Amsterdam

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Background

The Amsterdam Treaty, which was finally negotiated in Amsterdam 16-17 June 1997, resulted from an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which had started on 29 March 1996. It was the longest IGC so far in the history of the European Union (EU). Further, the IGC had itself been prepared through the so-called Reflection Group during the second half of 1995.

That such an IGC took place at this point in time was not due to a great wish on the part of the Member States to further deepen integration (Dinan 1999, 169). It took place because the preceding treaty reform resulting in the Maastricht Treaty had included the stipulation in the Treaty's Art. N, that such an IGC should take place in 1996.

Article N specified:

1. The government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the Union is founded.

If the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to those Treaties. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the case of institutional changes in the monetary area.

The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

2. A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this

Treaty for which revision is provided, in accordance with the objectives set out in Articles A and B (Council & Commission 1992, 138).

Agenda Setting

The Treaty also specified some of the agenda points of the future IGC:

- Article N(2): Articles A and B – general principles, including the pillar structure, effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the Community
- Article 189b(8): scope of the co-decision procedure
- Article J.4(6): security and defence, including role of Western European Union (WEU)
- Article J.10: provisions governing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
- Declaration 1: civil protection, energy and tourism
- Declaration 16: hierarchy of Community acts

Thus, unfinished business, and a feeling that further institutional reforms would be required, motivated the decision to call a new IGC relatively soon after Maastricht.

In the end it took a longer time to get Maastricht ratified than foreseen. The treaty finally entered into force in November 1993 (Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1994). The meeting of the European Council in Brussels in December 1993 added the following agenda points for the future IGC:

- role of the European Parliament
- size of the Commission
- weighting of votes in the Council
- efficiency of institutions (European Council 1993)

That the IGC should be prepared by a Reflection Group was decided at the meeting of the European Council on Corfu in June 1994, which also decided that two European Parliament representatives would participate in the work of the group. The Corfu summit further invited the institutions to prepare reports on the functioning of the Maastricht Treaty. The Reflection Group was given the mandate to

... examine and elaborate ideas relating to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union for which a revision is foreseen and other possible improvements in a spirit of democracy and openness, on the basis of the evaluation of the functioning of the treaty as set out in the reports. It will also elaborate options in the perspective of the future enlargement of the Union on the institutional questions set out in the conclusions of the European Council in Brussels and in the Ioannina agreement (weighting of votes, the threshold for qualified majority decisions, number of members of the Commission and any other measure deemed necessary to facilitate the work of the Institutions and guarantee their effective operation in the perspective of enlargement) (European Council 1994).

The Ioannina agreement referred to was concluded in the spring of 1994 in connection with the EU's fourth enlargement. In the EU of 12 Member States, the total number of votes in the Council was 76. Of these a Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) had been established at 54 votes. This meant that a blocking minority consisted of 23 votes. Two big states plus one small state (not including Luxembourg) could thus form a blocking minority. During accession negotiations with the four applicants it was decided to give Austria and Sweden four votes each and Finland and Norway three votes. This would increase the total to 90. It was then proposed, on the basis of an extrapolation, that the new QMV should be 27. The United Kingdom and Spain opposed this. They wanted to keep the blocking minority at 23. The foreign ministers found the compromise at Ioannina in Greece on 26 and 27 March 1994. The blocking minority would be 27 on condition that the Council would try to find a satisfactory solution if a minority between 23 and 27 Member States were against a proposal. In the end Norway did not join, thus, the enlarged EU would have a total of 87 votes and a QMV would be 87. The Ioannina compromise, therefore, came to refer to a situation where Member States representing between 23 and 25 votes opposed a proposal (Laursen 1996, 36). The new members, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined on 1 January 1995. The EU that went through the Amsterdam process thus consisted of 15 Member States.

The European Council at its meeting in June 1993 in Copenhagen had decided to offer membership to the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). So part of the context of the Amsterdam process was the future enlargements which might lead to an EU of more than 27 Member States, including 10 CEECs and Cyprus and Malta (Laursen 2001).

Another background was the deteriorating situation in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where EU's efforts to create peace revealed the Union's weakness in respect to the new second pillar of the

Maastricht Treaty, the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Similarly, questions were asked about the weaknesses of Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the Union's third pillar, partly because of the many refugees from former Yugoslavia and other crises areas in the world.

Preparation

During the spring of 1995, the Reflection Group members were appointed (see table 1.1) and the reports of the institutions were presented.

The Reflection Group was chaired by Carlos Westendorp from Spain. It started its work on 2 June 1995 in Messina, Italy, and presented its report to the meeting of the European Council in Madrid in December 1995.

Table 1.1: Members of the Reflection Group.

Austria	Permanent Representative Manfred Scheich
Belgium	Professor Franklin Dehousse
Denmark	Former Secretary General, ambassador Niels Ersbøll
Finland	Former Minister of Defence Ingvar S. Melin
France	Minister of European Affairs Michel Barnier
Germany	State Secretary Dr. Werner Hoyer, Foreign Ministry
Greece	Ambassador Stephanos G. Stathatos
Ireland	Minister of European Affairs Gay Mitchell
Italy	Ambassador Silvio Fagiolo
Luxembourg	Ambassador Joseph Weyland
The Netherlands	State Secretary Michiel Patijn, Foreign Ministry
Portugal	Professor, former Foreign Minister André Goncalves Pereira
Spain	State Secretary Carlos Westendorp, Foreign Ministry
Sweden	State Secretary Gunnar Lund, Foreign Ministry
United Kingdom	Minister of European Affairs David Davis
Commission	Commissioner Marcelino Oreja
European Parliament	Elisabeth Guigou, MEP (French Socialist, former minister of

	European Affairs) Elmar Brok, MEP (German Christian-Democrat)
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Source: Isaksen, Toft and Bødtscher-Hansen (1998), p. 17.

The Cannes meeting of the European Council 26 and 27 June 1995 noted with satisfaction that the work of the Reflection Group had started and suggested that “thoughts should now focus on a number of priorities to enable the Union to respond to its citizens’ expectations”:

- to analyse the principles, objectives and instruments of the Union, with the new challenges facing Europe;
- to strengthen common foreign and security policy so that it can cope with new international challenges;
- to provide a better response to modern demands as regards internal security, and the fields of justice and home affairs more generally;
- to make the institutions more efficient, democratic and open so that they are able to adjust to the demands of an enlarged Union;
- to strengthen public support for the process of European integration by meeting the need for a form of democracy which is closer to the citizens of Europe, who are concerned about employment and environment questions;
- to put the principle of subsidiarity into practice more effectively (European Council 1995a).

The Reflection Group report recommended that the IGC should concentrate its work on

- making Europe more relevant to its citizens;
- enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargement;
- giving the Union greater capacity for external action (Reflection Group 1995; European Council 1995b, annex 15).

The report had two parts: a 10-page overview and a 50-page summary of the main deliberations. The divisions between the Member States clearly emerged. It often used phrases such as “one of us believes that” and “one of us is opposed to.” On some issues, the conclusion might be that “a broad majority of members of the Group favours.” It is well known that the minority of one was usually the United Kingdom, which, under the Major Conservative government, opposed further integration (Nugent 1999, 77).

The meeting of the European Council in Madrid in December 1995 received the report from the Reflection Group “with great interest” and concluded that “the guidelines distilled within the Group” constituted “a

sound basis for the work of the Conference.” It was decided to officially open the IGC in Turin on 29 March 1996. The Madrid summit also laid out the basic procedure:

The Conference will meet regularly, in principle once a month, at the level of Foreign Affairs Ministers, who will have responsibility for all proceedings; preparations will be conducted by a working party made up of a representative of each Member State’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the President of the Commission.

The Secretary-General of the Council will make the necessary arrangements to provide secretarial support for the Conference.

Concerning the European Parliament the Madrid conclusions stated:

The European Parliament will be closely associated with the work of the Conference so that it is both briefed regularly and in detail on the progress of the discussions and can give its point of view, where it considers this necessary, on all matters under discussion. The detailed arrangements for such association will be determined by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs in line with the provisions which apply to the review of the Treaties.

The Parliament thus was not allowed a full participation despite its full participation in the Reflection Group. Finally, concerning applicant countries and members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) the Madrid conclusions stated:

The representatives of those countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have concluded Europe Agreements, and Malta and Cyprus, will be briefed regularly on the progress of discussions and will be able to put their points of view at meetings with the Presidency of the European Union to be held, in principle, every two months. The European Economic Area and Switzerland will also be briefed (European Council 1995b).

So the applicant countries (minus Turkey) would be able to put forward their points of view. The EEA countries, viz. Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, as well as Switzerland, would be briefed.

Prior to the IGC the Member States started putting forward proposals (European Parliament 1996; Griller *et al.* 1996). So did EU institutions and various private organizations.

The European Commission presented its opinion in February 1996 (European Commission 1996). The opinion was organized in three sections. The first section on “A People’s Europe” had a first part on the promotion of the European Social model (human rights, rule of law, the social dimension, employment and sustainable development). The second part, “Establishing an area of freedom and security,” dealt with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), including the Schengen Agreement. The Commission suggested that JHA, except judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, be transferred to the first pillar of the Union and that the Schengen Agreement be incorporated in the Treaty. A third part on “Simplifying and democratising Europe,” *inter alia* suggested the abolition of the cooperation procedure combined with an expanded use of co-decision.

Section two in the Commission opinion was entitled “A Clear Identity on the World Scene.” In respect to commercial policy, the Commission called for an updating of the Treaty in respect to services, intellectual property and direct foreign investment, referring to WTO developments. Concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Commission took the view that qualified majority voting (QMV) should be the norm. In respect to the Union’s defence identity, the IGC should “allow Union commitments to missions aimed at restoring or keeping peace to be written into the Treaty (‘Petersberg’ missions).”

The third section in the Commission opinion was entitled “Institutions for the enlarged Europe.” Enlargement required an adaptation of the institutions. The European Parliament should be limited to 700 members. Since almost all future new members were relatively small, there was a need to look at voting weights and rules in the Council:

... in order to maintain the existing balance, there is justification, when enlargement comes, for either adapting the weighting of votes or introducing a new system which makes a reference both to a majority of the Member States and a majority of the Union’s population (Ibid. p. 20).

Further, “in the context of enlargement, the number of [the Commission’s] Members should be reduced to one per Member State.” Majority voting should become the general rule, and the treaty should organize “closer cooperation” or “flexibility.” In this respect the Commission suggested four principles:

- (i) compatibility with the objectives of the Union;
- (ii) consistency with the institutional framework of the Union;

- (iii) opportunity for other Member States which are willing and able to join at any time;
- (iv) safeguarding of the single market and the policies accompanying it (Ibid., p. 22).

The IGC started with a meeting of the European Council in Turin on 29 March 1996. The various agenda points were put together in three main groups:

1. A Union closer to its citizens
2. The institutions in a more democratic and efficient Union
3. A strengthened capacity for external action of the Union.

The first group included respect for human rights, democratic values, equality and non-discrimination, JHA issues, the fight against unemployment, a healthy and sustainable environment, and subsidiarity. The second group included simplification of legislative procedures, the scope of co-decision, the composition of the European Parliament, the role of national parliaments, Council voting (weighting of votes, threshold for qualified majority vote, QMV), composition and efficiency of the Commission, functioning of the European Court of Justice and Court of Auditors, and rules to “enable a certain number of Member States to develop a strengthened cooperation.” The last point, also known as flexibility, already specified some conditions. It should be “open to all, compatible with [the] Union’s objectives, while preserving the *acquis communautaire*, avoiding discrimination and distortions of competition and respecting the single institutional framework.” The third group of issues were related to the CFSP, its principles, procedures and structures as well as budgetary provisions. The conference should also study “whether and how the provision for a new specific function could give to the Union the possibility of expressing itself in a more visible and coherent way and with a more perceptible face and voice.” Such a new function was popularly known as Mr/Ms CFSP. The Turin Council also called for a clearer definition of the relationship with the Western European Union (WEU) (European Council 1996a).

Conduct of the IGC

While formally the Ministers of Foreign Affairs were responsible for the IGC, “the bulk of the work was done by the Group of Representatives that met regularly for two days a week. Its composition was similar to the Reflection Group, on whose expertise it was thus able to draw” (Petite 1998). (See table 1.2).

Table 1.2: List of IGC Representatives of the Foreign Ministers and Commission President.

Austria	Manfred Scheich, Permanent Representative
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Belgium	Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarant, Permanent Representative
Denmark	Pelle Erling Rasmussen, Ambassador, former Secretary-General of the Council
Finland	Antti Satuli, Permanent Representative
France	Jacques Delors, Minister with responsibility for European Affairs
Germany	Gerhard Schröder, Minister of State
Greece	Ioannis Kranidiotis, MEP, former deputy Minister for European Affairs
Ireland	Michael D. Higgins, former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs
Italy	Roberto Benigni, Minister Plenipotentiary
Luxembourg	Jean-Jacques Kessler, Permanent Representative
the Netherlands	Wim Kok, State Secretary
Portugal	Manuel Pinheiro de Almeida, State Secretary
Spain	Francisco Ferraz, Permanent Representative
Sweden	Anders Österlund, State Secretary
United Kingdom	David Owen, Permanent Representative
Commission	Jos Manuel Gargallo, Commissioner

Source: CONF 3835/96

At the meeting in Florence in June, the European Council noted that the IGC had started its work. It stated that it expected “decisive progress” during the Irish presidency in the second part of the year. It asked the Irish Presidency to prepare “a general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties” for the Dublin meeting in December 1996 (European Council 1996b).

The main achievement of the Irish Presidency was the preparation of the draft requested by the Florence summit.

The draft’s main part A was divided into five sections:

1. An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
2. The Union and the Citizen
3. An Effective and Coherent Foreign Policy
4. The Union’s Institutions
5. Enhanced Cooperation – “Flexibility”

There was also a part B on other issues and a part C on simplification of the treaties. Most of this structure was retained by the final Treaty of Amsterdam. However, the draft

was still very tentative, suggesting some new treaty texts, but in many cases limiting itself to outline issues or options (CONF 2500/96).

The meeting of the European Council in Dublin 13 and 14 December welcomed the draft from the Presidency, seeing it as “a good basis” for future work. It called for completion of the IGC at Amsterdam in June 1997.

The Dublin summit noted “with approval the particular importance which the Presidency document attaches to the area of Justice and Home Affairs.” It called on the IGC

... to work to reach agreement on a strengthened capacity for action in relation to visas, asylum, immigration, the crossing of external borders, the fight against drugs and international crime including terrorism, offences against children and trafficking in persons. Europol should have operative powers working in conjunction with the national authorities to this end. These issues are of the most serious concern to citizens in all Member States and the Union must be given the means to act effectively in these areas.

The summit reaffirmed the importance of strengthening the Union’s capacity for external action. It also noted the absence of texts in the Irish draft concerning “the issue of flexibility and on certain sensitive institutional questions.” On the latter, the European Council stated:

Institutional issues will be central to the next phase of the negotiations. The Union needs to improve its ability to take decisions and to act. This is already true today and it will be even more necessary as the Union moves to enlarge its membership further. The Union must have comprehensible, transparent and democratic procedures and strong and effective institutions which enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens (European Council 1996c).

It was then left to the Dutch Presidency to finish the IGC during the first half of 1997.

One reason the IGC had moved slowly during 1996 was the opposition of the British Conservative government to the kind of changes most Member States considered important. It was no secret that it was hoped by many that the upcoming elections in the UK would lead to a change of government.

On 1 May 1997 the Labour Party won the elections. According to the Party Manifesto, Labour would give Britain a leadership role in Europe. The agenda for reform included rapid completion of the single market, high priority for enlargement, urgent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, greater openness and democracy in EU institutions, Britain’s signature of the Social Chapter, but also:

Retention of the national veto over key matters of national interest, such as taxation, defence and security, immigration, decisions over the budget and treaty changes, while considering the extension of Qualified Majority Voting in limited areas where that is in Britain’s interest (UK, Labour 1997).

The new Minister for Europe, Dough Henderson, took part in a meeting of the IGC Working Group of Personal Representatives in Brussels on 5 May 1997.

To prepare the Amsterdam summit scheduled for 16-17 June 1997, the Dutch Presidency decided to call a special summit on 23 May in Noordwijk. It was prepared at a meeting of foreign ministers in the Hague on 20 May. On 14 May 1997, prior to the meeting, the Dutch Presidency tabled a new compilation of texts under discussion, a so-called Non-Paper (SN/2555/97). After the summit in Noordwijk, where the EU leaders had a chance to meet the new British Prime Minister Tony Blair, optimism about Amsterdam increased.

The Non-Paper was followed by a “Consolidated Draft Treaty Texts” on 30 May 1997 (SN 600/97 (C 101)). Finally, the Draft Treaty of Amsterdam was issued on 12 June 1997 (CONF/4000/97).

The Amsterdam summit started 16 June in the morning and went into the early hours of 18 June. After the first day of discussions, the Dutch presidency put forward a working document in the morning of 17 June with suggestions for an overall compromise (CONF/4000/97 ADD.1).

Overview of the Amsterdam Treaty

The draft treaty which eventually emerged in Amsterdam in the morning of 18 June 1997 had the five sections of the Irish presidency draft plus a sixth section on Simplification and Consolidation of the Treaties (CONF/4001/97).

The first section, Freedom, Security and Justice, dealt with fundamental rights and non-discrimination as well as the Progressive Establishment of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (see contribution to this volume by Monica den Boer). “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States” (amended Art. F). However, the Union must also “respect the national identities of its Member States.” A general non-discrimination clause was added to the treaty, but the main innovation was a system of penalties against Member States that failed to respect the fundamental rights.

The new Area of Freedom, Security and Justice was one “in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, immigration, asylum and the prevention and combating of crime” (CONF/4001/97, p. 11). Basically the treaty moved a number of policy matters from the third pillar to the first pillar over a 5-year transition period during which unanimity would apply. However, the decision to fully apply the Community method for this area after five years would require a unanimous vote in the Council, except for aspects of visa policy, for

which QMV already applied (*Ibid.*, p. 20). The Treaty further integrated the Schengen *acquis* into the framework of the European Union, with certain matters relating to free movement eventually to go to the first pillar and other matters relating to police cooperation to the third pillar. The much reduced third pillar, dealing with Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, was improved in various ways, for instance by introducing the new instrument framework decision, which resembles the directive in the first pillar.

Protocols on the UK, Ireland (retaining border controls) and Denmark (only taking part in intergovernmental cooperation) complicated the JHA areas considerably.

The second section, The Union and the Citizen, included a new title on employment and improved articles on social policy, environment, public health and consumer protection (see contribution to this volume by Jonas Tallberg). The employment chapter called for a high level of employment, coordination, guidelines and incentive measures. In respect to social policy, the most important was that the UK now joined. The chapter on environment introduced the concept of sustainable development. Member States were allowed to “introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence.” The Commission must be notified. It will have six months to approve or reject the provisions, but “in the absence of a decision by the Commission within this period the national provisions ... shall be deemed to have been approved” (Art. 100a).

A number of other community policies were also included, some clearly less important than others: Citizenship of the Union, culture, sport, countering fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community, strengthening customs cooperation, outermost regions, island regions, overseas countries and territories, services of general economic interests, public service broadcasting, public credit institutions in Germany, voluntary service activities, animal welfare, trans-European networks and statistics. It was now specified that “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.” And the Union should respect and promote the diversity of cultures. The second section also had chapters on subsidiarity, transparency (decisions to be taken “as openly as possible,” right of access to documents) and quality of legislation (*Ibid.*, pp. 53-93).

Section three, An Effective and Coherent External Policy, mainly dealt with CFSP. It established a policy planning and early warning unit (Declaration to the Final Act, *ibid.*, p. 111). The Secretary-General of the Council was to become High Representative for CFSP, seconded by the deputy Secretary-General who would be responsible for running the

secretariat of the Council (Art. J.8). The third section also introduced a new category of “common strategies” to be decided by the European Council by unanimity. The Council should in principle be able to adopt joint actions, common positions or other decisions on the basis of a common strategy by a special QMV (at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members). On this point, however, the treaty included a double safeguard. First a Luxembourg-compromise-type veto:

If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity (Art. J.13(2)).

Secondly, something known as “constructive abstention” found its way into the treaty:

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes in accordance with Article 148(2) of the TEC, the decision shall not be adopted (Art. J.13).

Finally, the third section added services and intellectual property to the common commercial policy in the first pillar. Contrary to the normal QMV provision of the old Article 113, however, these new areas would require unanimity.

So, confronting the idea of “an effective and coherent external policy” the Member States hesitated and created loopholes (see also contribution to this volume by Simon Duke).

The Irish December draft outline had included the proposal to endow the Union with legal personality. This proposal was not retained in the final treaty.

Section four dealt with institutions. Not much was achieved in this area despite the importance attached to institutional changes at the outset of the IGC. The main institutional winner was the European Parliament. The use of the assent procedure and co-decision procedure was increased. In the end the increase in the use of QMV was much more modest than expected. And the difficult issues of weights of votes and threshold of QMV in the Council and size on the Commission were postponed (see later contribution by the author to this volume).

Finally, the treaty introduced provisions on flexibility (see contribution to this volume by Alexander Stubb). These introduced general clauses in the common provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), clauses specific to the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC or first pillar) and specific clauses for JHA (third pillar). The treaty set tight conditions for using the enabling clauses. No similar enabling clause was included in the second pillar. But, as mentioned, this pillar introduced “constructive abstention,” a kind of *ad hoc* flexibility.

Ratification

The Amsterdam Treaty was signed in Amsterdam on 2 October 1997. It entered into force on 1 May 1999, the first day of the second month after being ratified by all Member States. Germany was the first to deposit the instrument of ratification on 7 May 1998. France was the last on 30 March 1999. Ratification required referenda in Ireland and Denmark and a constitutional revision in France.

Table 1.3 gives an overview of the ratification processes in the Member States.

Table 1.3: Ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

<i>Member States</i>	<i>Dates of Ratification</i>	<i>Deposit of instruments</i>
Belgium	Senate (4 June 1998), Chamber of Representatives (17 June 1998), French Community (13 June 1998), Walloon Region (15 June 1998), German Speaking Community (30 November 1998), Flemish Region (15 December 1998), Brussels Capital Region (5 February 1999)	February 1999

Denmark	Parliament (7 May 1998), referendum (28 May 1998) (55.1%)	June 1998
Germany	Bundestag (7 May 1998), Bundesrat (27 May 1998)	May 1998
Greece	Parliament (17 February 1999)	March 1999
Ireland	Congress of Deputies (8 October 1998), Senate (24 November 1998)	January 1999
France	Revision of the Constitution (18 January 1999), National Assembly (4 March 1999), Senate (16 March 1999)	March 1999
Iceland	Referendum (22 May 1998) (61.27%), Seanad (18 June 1998), Dáil (25 June 1998)	July 1998
Italy	Chamber of Deputies (25 March 1998), Senate (3 June 1998)	July 1998
Luxembourg	Parliament (9 July 1998)	September 1998
the Netherlands	Second Chamber (5 November 1998), First Chamber (22 February 1998)	December 1998
Austria	Parliament (special constitutional law, amendment of the Constitution and Treaty of Amsterdam (9 July 1998)	July 1998
Portugal	Parliament (6 January 1999)	March 1999
Poland	Parliament (15 June 1998)	July 1998
Sweden	Parliament (29 April 1998)	May 1998
United Kingdom	House of Commons (19 January 1998), House of Lords (11 June 1998)	June 1998

Source: European Commission (2000), p. 372.

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