book Chapters by Finn Laursen
Explaining the Maastricht Treaty
Draft of book Chapter, "Explaining the Maastricht Treaty"
Which was published in book co-edited with Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, Maastricht: EIPA, 1992
From Introduction
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the member states of the European Community that started in Rome in December 1990 and was concluded in December 1991 in Maastricht, the Netherlands, exhibited the usual bargaining that is common to intergovernmental relations among the Twelve. The member states all brought their perceived national interests to the IGC, as they had done to the talks that preceded the Conference. Does this mean that knowledge about those national interests will allow us to explain the outcome? Or, is the EC more than intergovernmental relations that can be explained by traditional theories of international relations? Are there certain dynamics within the EC that need to be taken into account? Does the EC's position in the wider international system need to be considered, too? Do we need to look at the dynamics of the negotiations themselves to understand the outcome? This chapter will attempt a discussion of these questions, which are of a fundamental theoretical nature. As the author has argued on an earlier occasion it is important for our understanding of the EC to ask such analytical questions.
Download ViewExplaning the Amsterdam Treaty
Explaining and Evaluating the Amsterdam Treaty: Some Concluding Remarks
Finn Laursen
[Chapter from Finn Laursen, ed. The Amsterdam Treaty, Odense University Press, 2002]
Introduction
The Amsterdam Treaty was yet another treaty in the history of European integration. It was not normal politics; it was constitutive politics (Pedersen 1998, 56). It was yet another big bargain among the EU's Member States, setting some new rules for their cooperation. If we use the categories suggested by John Peterson, the type of decision finalized in Amsterdam in June 1997 was "history-making" and it took place at the super-systemic level. It was not policy-setting or policy-shaping, the more normal day-to-day decisions that take place at the systemic and sub-systemic levels. In the case of a history-making decision, the dominant actors would be the national governments in an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and the Heads of State and Government in the European Council. The kind of rationality, according to Peterson, would be political and legalistic, not the kind of technocratic, administrative rationality found at lover levels of decision-making (Peterson 1995).
In this final chapter the editor will suggest some conclusions from the chapters included in this volume and move beyond questions of explanation to briefly discuss how we can evaluate the Treaty of Amsterdam. How significant was it?
Download ViewExplaining the Treaty of Nice
Finn Laursen
[Chapter from Finn Laursen, ed. The Treaty of Nice, Nijhoff, 2006]
Introduction
In this chapter we shall discuss how to explain the Treaty of Nice. In the introductory chapter we mentioned Andrew Moravcsik's approach, liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). This approach can structure an analysis of a treaty reform like the Treaty of Nice, but many authors, including contributors to this book, have also pointed to limitations in the approach (see also Christiansen, Falkner and Jørgensen 2002).
Some of the criticisms concern the first stage, the formation of national preferences. According to Moravcsik, the main explanation of national preferences is that economic actors make demands to the politicians. These in turn supply solutions mainly to get re-elected. Moravcsik's explanation therefore downgrades the role of geopolitics, including ideas. Further, domestic institutions such as parliaments, party systems and public opinion do not play important roles.
Download ViewExplaining the Constitutional Treaty
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY IS DEAD, LONG LIVE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Finn Laursen
[Chapter from Finn Laursen, ed., The Rise and Fall of the Constitutional Treaty, Nijhoff, 2008]
Introduction
The Constitutional Treaty died when the French and Dutch electorates voted 'no' to ratification in 2005. The death was formally announced by the Member States in June 2007 when it was decided to drop efforts to resuscitate the Constitution and instead negotiate another treaty called a Reform Treaty. Although the Reform Treaty will include most of the institutional innovations of the Constitutional Treaty all references to 'Constitution' have been dropped. So have references to symbols of constitutionalism.
The constitutionalist rhetoric had backfired. The rhetoric had made it sound as if the proposed treaty was more than it was. After all it was still a treaty among sovereign states. It was not a real constitution of a state. The Member States remained the 'masters of the treaty.' Had it been ratified future changes would still have required unanimity.
The term 'constitution' is not well-defined. It has different meanings in different time periods and in different countries. But normally it refers to the organisation of a government and it implies the existence of restraints upon that government. Such restraints can exist through a division of powers among legislative, executive and judicial authorities as advocated by Charles-Louis de Montesquieu. Restraints can also be introduced by a vertical division of powers between different levels of government as we find in federal states. The famous US checks-and-balances would be a good example of a constitutional arrangement. Stipulations about individual rights also put restraints on governments (Friedrich, 1968).
Download ViewPolitics of the Constitutional Treaty: Four Analyses
"The Politics of the Constitutional Treaty: Elements of Four Analyses"
Finn Laursen
[Chapter from Johan From and Nick Sitter (eds.), Europe's Nascent State? Public Policy in the European Union. Essays in Honour of Kjell A. Eliasen. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2006]
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has gone through a number of treaty reforms in recent years. The EU itself was formed by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1992 and 1994). It combined the pre-existing European Communities (EC) in reformed versions, including plans for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), with two new pillars: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation. Further reforms followed through the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (Laursen 2002) and the Nice Treaty in 2001 (Laursen, 2006). Starting in February 2002 a Convention on the Future of Europe prepared a Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, usually referred to a Constitutional Treaty. The draft was completed in the summer of 2003. An Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) then met from October 2003 until June 2004 finalising a new draft treaty on the basis of the draft from the Convention. The ratification process started afterwards, but on 29 May the French and 1 June 2005 the Dutch voters voted 'No' to ratification in referenda. At the time of writing (December 2005) the future of the treaty is uncertain even if a majority of the member states have ratified it.
Download ViewAmsterdam Treaty: Introduction
Introduction: Overview of the 1996-97 Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) and the Treaty of Amsterdam
Finn Laursen
[Chapter from Finn Laursen, ed. The Amsterdam Treaty, Odense University Press, 2002]
BAckground
The Amsterdam Treaty, which was finally negotiated in Amsterdam 16-17 June 1997, resulted from an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which had started on 29 March 1996. It was the longest IGC so far in the history of the European Union (EU). Further, the IGC had itself been prepared through the so-called Reflection Group during the second half of 1995.
That such an IGC took place at this point in time was not due to a great wish on the part of the Member States to further deepen integration (Dinan 1999, 169). It took place because the preceding treaty reform resulting in the Maastricht Treaty had included the stipulation in the Treaty's Art. N, that such an IGC should take place in 1996.
Download ViewAmsterdam Treaty: Limited Institutional Reforms
Institutions and Procedures: The Limited Reforms
Finn Laursen
[Chapter from Finn Laursen, ed. The Amsterdam Treaty, Odense University Press 2002]
Introduction
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which negotiated the Amsterdam Treaty was called under Article N(2) of the Maastricht Treaty. Article B in that Treaty referred to the IGC as a possible forum for considering whether the policies and forms of cooperation, which were introduced by the treaty, should be revised to ensure the effectiveness of the mechanisms and institutions of the Community. More specifically, Article 189B(8) mentioned the scope of co-decision as an item for the agenda of the IGC. The Treaty further mentioned Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Art. J 10) and the role of the Western European Union (WEU) (Art. J 4(6)) as agenda items for the IGC. This, of course, included institutional issues, especially the question of whether the role of the Commission in the second pillar should be increased.
Download ViewNice Treaty: Introduction
Introduction: Overview of the Intergovernmental Conference 2000 and the Treaty of Nice
Finn Laursen
[Chapter from Finn Laursen, ed. The Treaty of Nice, Nijhoff, 2006]
Introduction
The Treaty of Nice was negotiated by an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which ran through most of the year 2000. The European Council in Nice, France, concluded the negotiations in December 2000. This treaty introduced a number of institutional changes in the EU. The changes were related to future enlargements, which took membership to 25 in May 2004. The treaty determines the number of votes in a future EU-27. The 12 future members are 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) as well as Cyprus and Malta. Turkey is also a candidate for membership but no future number of votes in the Council was assigned to Turkey in Nice.
Download ViewNice Treaty: Reweighting of Votes
Introduction: Overview of the Intergovernmental Conference 2000 and the Treaty of Nice
Finn Laursen
[Chapter from Finn Laursen, ed. The Treaty of Nice, Nijhoff, 2006]
Introduction
The Treaty of Nice was negotiated by an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which ran through most of the year 2000. The European Council in Nice, France, concluded the negotiations in December 2000. This treaty introduced a number of institutional changes in the EU. The changes were related to future enlargements, which took membership to 25 in May 2004. The treaty determines the number of votes in a future EU-27. The 12 future members are 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) as well as Cyprus and Malta. Turkey is also a candidate for membership but no future number of votes in the Council was assigned to Turkey in Nice.
Download ViewIntroduction: Overview of the Constitutional Treaty Process and Main Elements of the Treaty
Finn Laursen, "Introduction: Overview of the Constitutional Treaty Process and Main Elements of the Treaty", in Finn Laursen (ed.), The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty. Leiden: Martibus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, pp. 1-22.
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